COOPERATING OR CAVING IN: ARE
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS SHREWD OR
EXPLOITED IN PLEA BARGAINING
NEGOTIATIONS?
ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER*

Growing up watching Perry Mason was a key component in how I
viewed criminal law. Clever defense attorneys, working diligently, were
able to arrive at the truth about their innocent clients and demonstrated
that truth to the prosecutor, jury, and public with dramatic flair each
week. The criminal system appeared like a system working at its best.
Of course, this was not actually how any criminal law system has
ever operated and it clearly does not do so today. Leaving aside
whether those "aha" moments and confessions on the stand occur
outside of television and the movies,' Perry Mason never appeared to
handle cases by plea bargaining. Yet, like civil litigation, the vast
majority of criminal prosecutions are resolved by plea bargaining.2
The conference that we hosted at Marquette was designed to
examine the plea bargaining process more closely from both the
perspectives of criminal law and dispute resolution. This particular
essay is designed to add to the conversation by highlighting some
interesting statistics about the negotiation styles of criminal lawyers and
then hypothesizing why this behavior occurs.
The first part of this essay will examine the data from my negotiation
study regarding lawyers in general and then criminal lawyers.3 This
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Thanks to Mike Tuchalski, Mike
Emer, and Jonathan Scharrer for their research assistance. I am also grateful to participants
in the Marquette University Law School Plea Bargaining Conference and the ABA Section
on Dispute Resolution 2007 Annual Meeting for their very helpful feedback.
1. See LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 2001) for a more recent example.
2. Over ninety-five percent of criminal cases are handled by plea bargaining. Russell
Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining,91
MARQ. L. REV. 213, 215 n.8 (2007); see also Richard Birke, The Role of Trial in Promoting
Cooperative Negotiation in Criminal Practice, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 40 n.6 (2007) (citing
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 463 tbl.1, 512 tbl.7 (2004)).
3. For a more extensive review of my study, see Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering
Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV.
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essay will then outline several different theories for why criminal
lawyers might be so problem-solving. And finally, I will discuss what
the impact of problem-solving behavior might be on the criminal law
system.
I. NEGOTIATION STUDY

In 1976, Professor Gerald Williams studied the negotiation behavior
of lawyers by distributing a mail survey to roughly 1,000 attorneys in the
Phoenix area.4 Williams' study revealed that attorneys predominately
engaged in two styles of negotiation, which he labeled cooperative and
competitive. He found that approximately two-thirds of lawyers studied
were cooperative. He also found that negotiators from both styles could
be effective although cooperative lawyers tended to be more so.'
Twenty-five years later, I sought to update and expand Williams'
research, recognizing changes in the demographics of the bar and
emerging trends in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement
by adding more terms of descriptions to provide a more comprehensive
and clear picture of contemporary negotiation styles.6 This update has
allowed me to compare styles across time, 7 across geography, 8 across
practice area, 9 and across gender. ° I also found striking differences in
levels of effectiveness by negotiation style.1"
The study was sent to 1,000 attorneys in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
1,500 in Chicago, Illinois. The survey asked attorneys in each city to
choose adjectives describing their most recent negotiation counterpart,
rate their counterpart on a bipolar scale, indicate the goals of that
negotiation, and, finally, to rate the effectiveness of the tactics used in
the negotiation.12 The survey had an overall response rate of twentyNEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002).
4. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15-46 (1983).

5. Id. at 18-19.
6. Schneider, supra note 3, at 152-57.
7. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Perception, Reputation and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Negotiation Skills, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2000, at 24.
8. Catherine H. Tinsley, Jack J. Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Reputations in
Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 203, 208-09 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
9. Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are Really Doing
When They Negotiate,44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 616-18 (2006).
10. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Gender Myths and Reality in Negotiation (2007)

(unpublished article, on file with author).
11. Schneider, supra note 3, at 167, 175, 184.
12. See id. at 157-61.
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nine percent. 3
Statisticians at the Institute for Survey and Policy Research at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee performed cluster analysis on the
results to divide the studied attorneys into two, three, and four
groupings.' 4 The two-cluster analysis resulted in attorneys being labeled
either problem-solving or adversarial, much like the original Williams
study. 5 The three-cluster analysis resulted in groups that I labeled true
problem-solving, cautious problem-solving, and adversarial. I labeled
the four groups true problem-solving, cautious problem-solving, ethical
adversarial, and unethical adversarial. In comparing the behavior of
criminal law attorneys with that of attorneys in other practice areas, we
will use the results of the four-cluster analysis, so I have reprinted the
table of top twenty adjectives for the four clusters from the original
study in order to understand the four different styles under discussion
later in the article.

13. Id. at 158.
14. Cluster analysis uses a computer to find natural groups in the data by identifying
similar patterns among responses given in the survey. There was no attempt to tell the
computer what kind of patterns to find or to give particular emphasis to a certain set of
characteristics. The cluster analysis only looked for identifiable patterns among the responses
given by the attorneys.
15. For more on how the results in my study compared to Williams' study, see
Schneider, supra note 3, at 176-79; Schneider, supra note 7.
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Table 1
Tot) 20 Adjectives for Four Cluster 6

1

True ProblemSolving
Ethical

Cautious
Problem-Solving
Ethical

Ethical
Adversarial
Confident

Unethical
Adversarial
Irritating

2
3

Experienced
Personable

Experienced
Personable

Assertive
Arrogant

Stubborn
Headstrong

4

Self-controlled

Headstrong

Argumentative

5

Trustworthy
Rational

Confident

Experienced

Quarrelsome

6
7

Fair-minded
Agreeable

Rational
Agreeable

Demanding
Egotistical

Arrogant
Egotistical

8
9

Communicative
Realistic

Dignified

Ambitious
Stubborn

Manipulative
Assertive

10

Accommodating

Argumentative

Demanding

11
12

Perceptive
Confident

Tough
Irritating

Complaining
Hostile

13
14
15

Sociable
Self-controlled
Adaptable

Forceful
Firm
Quarrelsome

Suspicious
Conniving
Greedy

16
17
18

Dignified
Helpful
Astute

Masculine
Dominant
Ethical

Rude
Angry
Confident

19
20

Poised
Flexible

Deliberate
Hostile

Ambitious
Deceptive

The four-cluster analysis is interesting because there are striking
differences even when comparing similar groups. For example, the
cautious problem-solvers were engaged in completely positive behavior.
All of the adjectives describing them are favorable, and they have good
behavioral characteristics such as ethical, experienced, rational,
confident, agreeable, and dignified. Yet, the effectiveness rating of the
cautious problem-solvers versus the true problem-solvers was
dramatic-23.5% versus 71.8% (see Table 2 below). What was the
difference? Those lawyers in the cautious group were cautiouscautious about truly engaging in problem-solving behavior. The true
problem-solvers had far more skills in their repertoire and were
effective in a triangle of skills-assertiveness, empathy, and flexibility.
16. Schneider, supra note 3, at 180.
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The lawyers with these two approaches share ethical behavior and a
pleasant personality, but the true problem-solver goes further in these
three skills. The true problem-solver is better at asserting the case
(rated highly in preparation, astuteness about the law, and being
realistic) and better at talking about the case as well (rated highly in
being poised, forthright, communicative, reasonable, and sincere). The
true problem-solver is better at understanding that negotiation can have
mutual benefits (found in the bipolar descriptions in Appendix A) and is
also better at working with the other side (rated highly in
accommodating, agreeable, helpful, perceptive, and tactful). Finally, the
true problem-solver is highly rated in adaptability, facilitating the
agreement, and flexibility. These are all skills that, apparently, the
cautious problem-solvers do not have.
However, these cautious problem-solvers were still rated far more
highly in effectiveness on behalf of their clients than either group of
adversarial lawyers. It is perhaps heartening to see the perceived
effectiveness of lawyers drop rather dramatically as the level of
adversarial behavior rises.
While there are dramatic differences
between ethical and unethical adversarial behavior, we should still note
that the ethical adversarials have several strong negative adjectives
attributed to them (such as arrogant, egotistical, and irritating) and are
significantly less effective for their clients than cautious problem-solvers.
The differences between the ethical and unethical adversarial
lawyers (as shown in Table 1 above) can be found in four areas. First,
the ethical adversarial lawyers still are considered trustworthy (that is,
rated highly in ethical behavior) while the unethical adversarial lawyers
are highly rated in being manipulative, conniving, and deceptive-not at
all trustworthy. Second, unethical adversarial lawyers are also not
trusting, rated highly in being suspicious of the other side. Third, there
is a difference of tone. While the ethical adversarials are tough and
firm, unethical adversarials are generally considered to be rude and
angry. Finally, the only group of lawyers not viewed as experienced is
the unethical adversarials who are also missing the adjective of
deliberate, perhaps reflecting a lack of preparation or thoughtfulness
about their case. The bipolar behavior ratings (shown in Appendix A)
further differentiate between the ethical and unethical adversarial
attorneys, describing the unethical group as untrustworthy, unpleasant,
inflexible, and not understanding of or caring to understand the other
side. It should be of little surprise, as shown in Table 2 below, that only
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2.6% of these unethical
adversarial lawyers were perceived as effective
7
by their peers.
Table 2
Four Cluster Breakdown by Effectiveness 8
Ineffective

Average

Effective

1.3%

26.9%

71.8%

Total
Percentage
of the Bar
by Cluster
38.5%

11.8%

64.7%

23.5%

27.5%

39.8%

44.4%

15.8%

21.5%

Unethical
Adversarial

75.3%

22.1%

2.6%

12.5%

Totals

21.7%

40.5%

37.8%

N = 61819

True
ProblemSolving
Cautious
ProblemSolving
Ethical
Adversarial

So, in comparing lawyer behaviors across the clusters, it is clear that
there are strong differences in style-and that these differences result in
a clear disparity in effectiveness ratings as well. Obviously, this study
measures perceptions rather than some objective measure of
effectiveness. Yet, perceptions of one lawyer by another lawyer are
clearly more accurate than self-evaluations and are considered valuable
given the similar education and practice area." We might also worry
about the "punishment" effect-this person "beat" me in the
negotiation so I will rate them lower in effectiveness to get back at them.
In fact, as further explained in the original article, the lower ratings were
17. See id. at 184.
18. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 616 (Table 3 in original article).
19. X' = 342.6, df = 6, p < .001.
20. See KELLY G. SHAVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES 21-34
(1975) (explaining that attributions are more likely to be correct when the observer has
experience, intelligence, and can empathize with others).
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often backed up with §tories, including objective measures that would
support the ineffectiveness ratings.21 For example, "ineffective" lawyers
included those who were reprimanded by the judge or refused a
settlement offer for much more than they received at trial.22
II. WHAT DOES THE STUDY SAY ABOUT CRIMINAL LAW?

The following table illustrates the four cluster analysis and highlights
the unique characteristics found among criminal lawyers who responded
to the study.
Table 3
23
Practice Area by Cluster

0

0

True

42.0%

49.2%

44.7%

36.4%

37.4%

38.2%

37.7%

39.3%

34.0%

22.0%

23.4%

31.1%

25.3%

23.5%

23.0%

27.5%

22.0%

20.3%

19.1%

18.9%

23.2%

32.4%

24.6%

21.5%

2.0%

8.5%

12.8%

13.6%

14.1%

5.9%

14.8%

11.8%

8.7%

10.2%

8.1%

39.4%

17.1%

5.9%

10.6%

N = 578

ProblemSolving
Cautious
ProblemSolving
Ethical
Adversarial
Unethical
Adversarial
Total % by
Practice
Area

Compared against the other practice areas, criminal law had the
highest percentage of true problem-solving attorneys at 49.2%. The
average of all other practice areas at 39.3% is far less than the

21.
22.
23.
24.

Schneider, supra note 3, at 194-95, 195 n.102.
Id. at 195 n.102.
See Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 616 (Table 4 in original).
This table is not statistically significant.
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percentage in criminal law. Also, criminal law had one of the lowest
amounts of unethical adversarial attorneys (8.5%) behind only
commercial law (5.9%) and corporate (2.0%). The number of criminal
lawyers rated as problem-solving (adding together both true and
cautious problem solvers) is only lower than one other practice area
(corporate lawyers rated as 76% against 71% for criminal lawyers).
Also, not only are criminal lawyers rated highly as problem-solving
lawyers, but they are also rated as one of the lowest adversarial
attorneys. Again, the only practice area that had a lower percentage of
adversarial attorneys was corporate lawyers with 24% versus 28.8% for
criminal lawyers. Conversely, family lawyers were not only rated lowest
in problem-solving behavior with only 60.7%, but were also rated
highest in adversarial lawyers with 39.4%. These results seem to
contradict general perceptions about not only criminal law, but also
family law as well. Family law has traditionally been seen as taking
more of a problem-solving approach; however the results indicate that
this is not the case. 21 Surprisingly, the results turn general perception on
its head by showing that criminal law appears to be the most problemsolving, while family law is the most adversarial.
At first glance these results may seem surprising. Perpetuated by
popular culture, initial impressions of criminal law often include a
prosecutor and criminal defense lawyer engaging in a ruthless battle for
victory. However, the results from the study suggest that criminal law
may be an unexpectedly fertile environment to maximize positive
problem-solving methods.

25. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 618-19 (explaining why family lawyers are
rated as the most adversarial).
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Figure 1
True Problem-Solving by Practice Area
True Problem-Solving
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Tables 4, 5, and 6 highlight the differences even further. Criminal law is
the highest practice area in true problem-solving by ten percentage
points. At the other extreme, criminal law also has a very low
percentage of unethical adversarial negotiators.
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Figure 3
Criminal v. All Lawyers
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A further breakdown of criminal lawyers reveals some interesting
differences, although the number of studied lawyers was too low to draw
broad inferences. First, in the two cluster analysis (problem-solving and
adversarial, see Table 7), there was a noted difference in the styles
between prosecutors and defenders. While prosecutors were problemsolving in 64.7% of the cases, defenders were seen as problem-solving in
86.4%.26 Similarly, in the four cluster analysis, (see Table 8), there was a
huge percentage difference in styles. Prosecutors were true problemsolving in 38.2% of the cases while defenders were true problem-solving
in 68.2%."
Table 4
Two Cluster Analysis by Case Side
Prosecutors

Defense Attorneys

Problem-Solving

64.7%

86.4%

Adversarial

35.3.%

13.6%

Table 5
Four Cluster Analysis by Case Side
Prosecutors

Defense Attorneys

True Problem-Solving

38.2%

68.2%

Cautious ProblemSolving
Ethical Adversarial

26.5%

18.2%

26.5%

9.1%

Unethical Adversarial

8.8%

4.5%

While the numbers in both the two cluster and four cluster analysis for
prosecutors mirror the general ratings for all lawyers, the numbers for

26. This is marginally significant with p = .067, but the lack of statistical significance is
more likely due to the very few number of cases (n = 56).
27. This is not statistically significant (p = .16), but is nonetheless striking.
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defense attorneys are quite striking. The difference between the
average for all lawyers in the two cluster analysis is over 20% (65%
problem-solving for all lawyers versus 86% problem-solving for defense
attorneys) and almost 30% in the four cluster analysis. (39% true
problem-solving for all lawyers versus 68% true problem-solving for
defense lawyers). No other group of lawyers appears to be so problemsolving. And this rating comes from the prosecutorswith whom they are
negotiating.
The style rating for prosecutors varied when public defenders versus
private defense attorneys were rating them (71.4% problem-solving
from public defenders versus 63.6% from private defense attorneys).28
There was no difference when prosecutors rated the defense attorneys
in terms of style.
The numbers in this part of the study were very limited, so it would
be quite interesting to run this with a larger data set to see if one could
find statistically significant differences between the prosecution and
defense.
III. WHY ARE CRIMINAL LAWYERS MORE PROBLEM-SOLVING?

There are several different reasons why criminal lawyers might be
more problem-solving than their peers in other practice areas. This
section of the essay outlines these theories.
A. Repeat Play and Reputation
In their seminal article about cooperation among lawyers, Ronald
Gilson and Robert Mnookin outline a theory of reputation markets
where lawyers in smaller practice areas and narrower geographic
regions are able to build a reputation for problem-solving.29 This
reputation for problem-solving will be worthwhile in terms of resolving
cases through negotiation because this will save clients time and money.
Elsewhere, I have written about how this reputation theory has been
demonstrated in my study when comparing geographic regions' but was
not actually shown to hold true in the practice area of family law.3 In
the criminal law context, however, it is clear that extremely high levels
of problem-solving behavior are exhibited between the prosecutor and

28. p = .5, so this was also not statistically significant.
29. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 525-27, 537-41 (1994).
30. Tinsley, Cambria, & Schneider, supra note 8, at 208-09.
31. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 616-19.
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the defendant's attorney. In criminal law, the geographic area of
practice is narrow and the population of prosecutors and criminal
lawyers is also limited.
Criminal lawyers deal with each other
repeatedly. In the civil law context, Jason Johnston and Joel Waldfogel
demonstrated how lawyers that have already dealt with one another
were more likely to reach a settlement the next time they interacted.32
As Richard Birke has discussed, this cooperative behavior can be
expected when there are relationships with no known end and that are
likely to continue.
Furthermore, the bargaining relationship is
straightforward with little complexity or worry over miscommunication
that might distort otherwise cooperative behavior.3 3 So, given the small
population of criminal lawyers, the likelihood of ongoing relationships,
clear communication, and problem-solving behavior could be
understood to occur as a result of repeat play among the lawyers.
B. Docket Load
Problem-solving behavior could also result from the clear need to
settle cases and move work along. For example, in the two primary
counties examined in this study, the caseloads for both prosecutors and
public defenders were impressive. The average prosecutor in Chicago
had 600 total cases' while prosecutors in Milwaukee had over 280
cases.35 In order to focus on the cases that will be proceeding to trial, in
order to actually go home at night, criminal lawyers need to move the
bulk of their cases quickly to the plea bargaining stage in order to get to
the next one. Alafair Burke also explains that prosecutors pick certain
cases for which they have a "passion" based on either the facts or the
law of that case and choose to focus on those cases for trial.36 Because
32. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?
Evidencefrom FederalCivil Litigation,31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002).
33. See Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated
Prisoner'sDilemma, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 188 (1995); see also Birke, supra note 2, at
59-62.
34. Eric Zorn, Cuts May Throw Scales of Justice Off Balance, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2007, at
C1 (quoting State's Attorney Richard Devine citing the 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics).
35. See Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, ALLOCATION OF PROSECUTOR POSITIONS
15, apps. 1 & 3 (2007), available at http://www.legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/07-9Full.pdf
(noting that from 2002-2006 staff positions in prosecutors' offices decreased while caseloads
increased and indicating the number of full-time equivalent prosecutors by county and the
caseload by county); see STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES
IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 124-26 (2005) (discussing how different public
defenders deal with their caseloads regarding plea bargaining).
36. Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion and Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 183,
195-203 (2007).
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adversarial behavior during the plea bargaining will likely add more
time to the plea bargaining itself,37 criminal lawyers on both sides have
incentives to be more cooperative and move quickly to resolution.
C. The Alternative to Negotiation Is Clear (and Punitive)
When the law is relatively clear, lawyers have an easier time
"bargaining in the shadow of the law. 3 8 In most criminal cases, the
facts, the law, and the likely sentence are relatively clear.39 Prosecutors
and defenders are negotiating over relatively few contentious issues and
are negotiating over the sentence at the margins. With the trial outcome
predictable in many cases, there is little reason (or ability) to be
adversarial since the alternative (trial outcome) is clear.
D. Incentives to Pleafor Both Sides
It may be that prosecutors are more problem-solving than other
lawyers because of the cases they take. Prosecutors have an incentive to
maximize their conviction rate and, therefore, are more likely to only go
to trial with sure winners. Less clear cases on either the law or
procedure will result in pleas. Doubtful or hard cases can be avoided by
a prosecutor who does not press charges. Civil litigators, by contrast,
work to maximize financial returns. Depending on how compensation is
structured, a civil litigator may purposely take the harder, riskier case,
or take the case with unclear law, or take cases indiscriminately and in
high numbers without regard to the likelihood of success. Without the
clear law or persuasive facts that a prosecutor can select in his cases, the
civil litigator might be comparatively more adversarial in dealing with
her cases."
Defense attorneys also have a large incentive to plead their cases
rather than go to trial. As Russell Covey explains, sentences reached in
plea agreements versus at trial are significantly shorter; this trial penalty
can be as high as 300% to 500% in some cases.41 So, for example, a plea

37. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 776, 778-80 (1984).
38. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979).
39. See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 50-69 (1993) (discussing the dynamics of plea bargaining).

40. I am grateful to Professor Michael O'Hear for this point.
41. See Covey, supra note 2, at 225-26 (citing Candace McCoy, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Hammer: The Trial Penalty in the USA, in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 23, 27 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003)).
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agreement for unlawful entry might be six months while the sentence
after trial on burglary charges could be a maximum of thirty years.42
Given the punitive effect of risking trial, only the most confident
defendants will pursue trial. More likely, they will be forced to reach a
plea agreement. Similarly, prosecutors, knowing the punitive effect of
risking trial, can let the alternative speak for itself and have no need to
engage in adversarial behavior. 3
Furthermore, adversarial behavior by defense lawyers can be
punished in other ways by prosecutors. As Covey discussed, in Milton
Heumann's study of plea bargaining, defense attorneys were rewarded
for cooperative behavior through informal discovery rules where
prosecutors permit open access to case files." When defense attorneys
were more adversarial, filing motions or jury-trial demands, prosecutors
punished this behavior by denying these attorneys access to previously
open files."
E. Clients and Victims Are Not as Involved with "Their" Lawyers
As discussed earlier, one might think that family lawyers, with their
repeat play and often sensitive case load, might be more problemsolving. This is actually not the case, and family lawyers have the
highest percentage of adversarial behavior of all practice areas. 6 One
explanation for this result in family law is that the clients engaged in
family law cases push this adversarial behavior. In other words, the
clients are "out for blood" and will hire their attorneys and make
strategic decisions based on the desire to hurt the other side. "7 Similarly,
in other types of civil litigation, the clients might push their lawyers to
be more adversarial.
In criminal law, there is a different kind of client involvement on
both sides. First, on the prosecutor side, the prosecution officially
represents the "state." The victim or victim's family is not officially
represented by the prosecutor and is often not part of the case at all
unless the case proceeds to trial where testimony might be needed.48
42. See id. at 228.
43. See also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy RelationshipBetween CriminalProcedureand
CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 23-52 (1997) (discussing how pay scales, crime rates, and

wealth affect both prosecutorial and defense selection of cases).
44. Covey, supra note 2, at 235.
45. See id. at 235-36 (citing MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 69-75 (1977)
(discussing the impact of informal discovery mechanisms on bargaining)).
46. Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 617.
47. See id. at 618.
48. See generally Symposium, Restorative Justice in Action, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 247
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What this means is that the person most likely to push for a harsh
sentence and take a more adversarial approach in any plea bargaining
negotiation is actually not involved.
On the defendant side, there is also a difference between typical civil
litigation clients and defendants. Criminal defendants, unless this is a
high-end white collar prosecution, tend not to have the education, social
status, or ability to direct their attorneys in the same way as other
litigants. 49 Furthermore, in many of these cases, the defendant is not
paying the attorney and, therefore, has even less power to be directive in
how the case is handled.5 ' Again, in the criminal law context compared
to other contexts, the client here has little ability to push for adversarial
approaches in negotiation or to hold out for better bargains.
F PretrialDetention
One last reason that plea bargains might be so cooperative is how
they are framed to the defendant. Richard Birke, Stephanos Bibas, and
others have written about the impact of loss aversion on the view of the
defendant.51 One could hypothesize that a defendant might want to
avoid the certain "loss" encompassed in a guilty plea and, therefore,
would hold out for trial. In reality, however, the typical loss aversion
reaction and avoidance of plea bargains does not occur. When the
defendant is already in jail, a plea that gets him or her out of jail with
time served looks like a gain. With close to three-fourths of federal
felony defendants in jail prior to trial and close to two-thirds of state
felony arrestees not out on bail, a large proportion of defendants are
calculating the impact of their plea from a jail cell. With the horrors of
pretrial detention well documented, the guilty plea is the most effective
method to ensure the end of the legal process and getting out of jail as
soon as possible. 2

(2005).

Restorative justice aims to involve victims more in the criminal law process.

Nonetheless, even here, victims do not often work directly with the prosecutor but rather with
other branches of the DA's office. Michael O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From
Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323,324-25 (2007).
49. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,

EDUCATION

AND

CORRECTIONAL

POPULATIONS

1-3

(2003),

available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf.
50. See BOGIRA, supra note 35, at 125-26.
51. See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
205, 210-16; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2507-12 (2004).

52. See Covey, supra note 2, at 239-40.
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COOPERA TING OR CA VING IN?
IV. WHAT IS THE STORY? CAVING OR COOPERATING?

One could tell two different kinds of stories about what is going on
in the criminal law bar. On the one hand, this study could show how
well repeat play, long term reputations, and a joint interest in justice,
promote problem-solving behavior. Prosecutors and defense attorneys
could be working efficiently and fairly together in resolving an
overwhelming number of cases appropriately.53 On the other hand, this
study could be merely confirming just how stacked the system is. The
fact that defense attorneys appear to be so overwhelmingly problemsolving could be evidence of a system that forces ill-informed, jailed,
poor defendants working with underpaid, overworked defense lawyers
to accept pleas despite legal rights, evidence, and even possible
innocence.54 It could also be that prosecutors are feeling benign toward
their counterparts-after all, the prosecutors generally win-and
"reward" defense attorneys with a positive assessment of their
negotiation behavior. Defense attorneys could be no better or worse
than other attorneys but just could be getting better ratings from their
prosecutorial peers.5 Or possibly the answers lie in the combination of
all of these theories. With criminal justice reform an ongoing issue, we
can hope that bringing both dispute resolution and criminal law
perspectives to bear on the question of plea bargaining can help
illuminate the whole story.

53. See MCCOY, supra note 39, at 53-64 (explaining the view taken by courtroom
"insiders" regarding plea bargaining).
54. MCCOY, supra note 39, at 64-69 (explaining the view taken by outsiders, the public
and those not part of the courtroom professionals); see also, BOGIRA, supra note 35, at 12526; Michael O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and ProceduralJustice, 42 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007).
55. I am grateful to Professor Chad Oldfather for this point.
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Appendix A
Top 20 Behaviors for Four Cluster"
Problem-Solving

3

Interested in his
client's needs

Cautious
Problem-Solving
Did not use
derogatory personal
references
Interested in his
client's needs
Did not use
offensive tactics

4

Honest

Courteous

5

Pursued best
interest of client

6
7

Friendly
Zealous
representation

Zealous
representation
within bounds
Honest

1
2

Did not use
derogatory personal
references
Courteous

Ethical
Adversarial
Interested in
his client's
needs
Unrealistic
initial position
Extreme
opening
demand
Not interested
in my client's
needs
Aggressive

Unethical
Adversarial
Not interested in my
client's needs

Arrogant
Prepared

Uncooperative
Narrow range of
strategies

Rigid
Arrogant
Unreasonable
Single solution

within bounds

8

Intelligent

9

Reasonable

10

Tactful

11

Cooperative

12
13

Adhered to legal
courtesies
Prepared

14

Forthright

Aggressive

15

Trustful

16
17

Sincere
Accurate
representation of

Inaccurately
estimated case
Insincere
Fixed conception of
problem

position
Facilitated

Distrustful

18

19

Viewed negotiation
as possibly having

Narrow view of
problem
Extreme opening
demand
Did not consider my
needs
Negotiation
win/lose
Unrealistic initial
position
Unconcerned how I
look

Obstructed

mutual benefit

20

Did not use threats

Inflicted needless
harm

56. Schneider & Mills, supra note 9, at 615.

